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Defend Forward & Sovereignty: How 




 To thwart a seemingly neve rending bombardment of 
cyberattacks, the U.S. Department of Defense recently im-
plemented a new strategy – defending forward. 
This approach demands persistently engaging the enemy on 
a daily basis to disrupt cyber activity. Rather than waiting 
to be attacked, the United States is bringing the fight to the 
enemy. However, this strategy poses fascinating and com-
plex questions of international law. In particular, because 
most defend forward operations fall within the gray zone of 
warfare, it remains unclear whether these operations vio-
late the sovereignty of American adversaries or even third 
party nation states in whose cyberspace U.S. Cyber Com-
mand is operating. This paper proposes that defend for-
ward does not violate sovereignty within international law. 
First, sovereignty is a principle of international law, not a 
rule the United States can violata. Second, American do-
mestic law has limited defend forward operations to pro-
portional responses to persistent cyber-attacks and threats. 
                                                                                                             
 *  Elya Taichman serves as the Legislative Director for Congresswoman 
Lori Trahan (D-MA) where he advises her on a range of issues including nation-
al security and foreign policy. He is currently obtaining his J.D. at Temple Uni-
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Finally, America's chief adversaries have fundamentally 
different understandings of sovereignty, which reinforces 
the necessity and legality of defend forward. Overall, de-
fend forward should be viewed as fitting squarely in the ex-
isting framework of international law. Whether defend for-
ward will succeed, however, is another question. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States is under perpetual attack and old strategies 
are not working. The ubiquity of connectivity in the digital age and 
societal dependence on the Internet for the most basic of actions 
has rendered cyberspace a critical realm to be defended. The Unit-
ed States’ adversaries have shown an insatiable appetite for hack-
ing American cyberspace—whether to steal data, disrupt elections, 
or merely cause fear—that has yet to be quenched. Regrettably, old 
Cold War strategies like deterrence have not worked in cyberspace 
because the costs inflicted on enemies are not severe enough for 
cyber warfare.1 As Commander of U.S. Cyber Command, General 
Paul Nakasone wrote, “a reactive and defensive posture proved 
inadequate to manage evolving threats.”2 Recognizing this dilem-
ma, in 2018 the Department of Defense (DoD) implemented a new 
strategy for combatting adversaries in this new arena—defending 
forward.3 
Defending forward entails persistently engaging the enemy on 
a daily basis to “disrupt or halt malicious cyber activity at its 
source, including activity that falls below the level of armed con-
flict.”4 The goal is to make it harder for adversaries to succeed in 
their cyber–attacks. It is accomplished through strengthening de-
fenses on government networks, critical infrastructure, and coordi-
nating with private entities.5 This strategy demands working with 
American allies and hunting together for adversaries in allied cy-
berspace.6 Additionally, defending forward attempts to prevent 
adversaries from being able to launch an attack in the first place. 
                                                                                                             
 1 James Andrew Lewis, Toward a More Coercive Cyber Strategy, CTR. 
FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. (March 10, 2021), https://www.csis.org/analysis/
toward-more-coercive-cyber-strategy. 
 2 Paul M. Nakasone & Michael Sulmeyer, How to Compete in Cyberspace: 
Cyber Command’s New Approach, FOREIGN AFF. (Aug. 25, 2020), 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-08-25/cybersecurity. 
 3 3.U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CYBER 
STRATEGY (2018). 
 4 Id at 1. 
 5 Nakasone & Sulmeyer, supra note 2. 
 6 Id. (describing the “hunt forward” mission Cyber Command completed in 
2019 in Montenegro). 
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Gathering intelligence ahead of attacks and deploying cyber–
weapons to preempt or prevent those attacks is essential.7 
However, defending forward poses important questions, espe-
cially under international law. First, it remains unclear whether 
defend forward cyber operations amount to a use of force, an 
armed attack, a prohibited intervention, or a violation of another 
nation’s sovereignty. Ultimately, the bulk of actions under defend-
ing forward will largely exist in a gray space that is a level below a 
use of force.8 As such, defend forward demands an understanding 
of whether it violates the target nation’s or a third–party nation’s 
sovereignty. Overall, sovereignty and defend forward are compati-
ble because American domestic law has authorized only propor-
tional responses to cyber–attacks and threats. Additionally, under 
international law, sovereignty, as applied to cyberspace, is a prin-
ciple that must be considered, but it is not a rule that can be violat-
ed. Importantly, Cyber Command has thus far attempted operations 
that involve only de minimis effects on third–party nations’ sover-
eignty. Finally, the adversaries that Cyber Command targets have 
fundamentally different understandings of sovereignty than the 
United States and its allies. Russia and China, for example, wield 
sovereignty as a shield under international law while simultaneous-
ly slashing American sovereignty with the sword of cyber–attacks. 
This reinforces the United States’ right to respond in–kind through 
defend forward, even if it is no longer waiting to be attacked. 
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CYBERSPACE 
This section begins by discussing how international law classi-
fies different actions in cyberspace and cyberwar, from espionage 
to an armed attack. While most of these categories are clear under 
international law, sovereignty violations in cyberspace are not. 
Next, the section includes a brief discussion on the traditional no-
tions of sovereignty, which demonstrate why cyberspace defies 
traditional classification. Finally, the section lays out the debate 
between those who argue sovereignty is a rule that may be violated 
and those who view it instead as a principle. 
                                                                                                             
 7 Nakasone & Sulmeyer, supra note 2. 
 8 See id. 
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a. How the Structure of International Law Renders Sovereignty 
Critical for Analyzing Defend Forward’s Gray Zone Activities 
The United States has recognized that international law gov-
erns cyberspace and cyberwar.9 In a 2012 speech, State Depart-
ment Legal Advisor Harold Koh made this unambiguous when he 
explained that cyberspace is not a “law–free zone.”10 For Koh, new 
technologies in cyberspace have raised new questions in interna-
tional law, but not whether international law applies to cyber-
space.11 The vast majority of sovereign states ascribe to this view-
point, as does the Tallinn Manual 1.0 which proclaims, “that gen-
eral principles of international law appl[y] to cyberspace.”12 This 
matters because many scholars have argued that the Internet is so 
fundamentally different from physical space that the normal order 
would not apply.13 Recognizing that international law governs cy-
                                                                                                             
 9 Harold Koh, State Department Legal Advisor, International Law in Cy-
berspace, Address at USCYBERCOM Inter-Agency Legal Conference Ft. 
Meade, MD (Sept. 18, 2012), https://harvardilj.org/wp-content/uploads/sites
/15/2012/12/Koh-Speech-to-Publish1.pdf [hereinafter Koh Speech] (opining, 
“[T]he United States has made clear our view that established principles of in-
ternational law do apply in cyberspace.”); Brian Egan, State Department Legal 
Advisor, Remarks on International Law and Stability in Cyberspace, Address at 
Berkeley Law School, CA, (Nov. 10, 2016), https://2009-2017.state.gov/s/l/
releases/remarks/264303.htm [hereinafter Egan Speech] (explaining, “There are 
three pillars to the U.S. strategic framework, each of which can help to ensure 
stability in cyberspace by reducing the risks of misperception and escalation. 
The first is global affirmation of the applicability of existing international law to 
State activity in cyberspace in both peacetime and during armed conflict.). 
 10 Koh Speech, supra note 9, at 3 
 11 Id. 
 12 TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER 
WARFARE 13 (Michael N. Schmitt, gen. ed., 2013). The Tallinn Manual is a non-
binding, academic study on the application of international law in cyberspace. 
The experts who compiled it seek to answer relevant questions on how nations 
should behave in cyber space. Michael Schmitt led the project. Id. 
 13 See David R. Johnson & David G. Post, Laws and Borders – The Rise of 
Law in Cyberspace, 48 STANFORD LAW REVIEW 1367, 1370 (1996) (explaining 
that “Cyberspace radically undermines the relationship between legally signifi-
cant (online) phenomena and physical location . . . The Net thus radically sub-
verts a system of rule-making based on borders between physical spaces, at least 
with respect to the claim that cyberspace should naturally be governed by terri-
torially defined rule.”); John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence 
of Cyberspace, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (1996) (arguing “Govern-
ments of the Industrial World  . . . You have no sovereignty where we gath-
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berspace is a necessary precondition to debating the legalities of 
defend forward because only sovereign states can make interna-
tional law. 
The United Nations Charter is a useful place to begin an inves-
tigation of how international law applies in cyberspace and to 
cyberwar. Article 2(4) prohibits the “threat or use of force against 
the territorial integrity or political independence of any State.”14 
Coupled with Article 51, sovereign states are permitted to use 
force in self–defense against an “armed attack.”15 While the United 
States, unlike most other states, has not recognized a difference 
between an armed attack and the use of force, many cyber actions 
may take place below the threshold of an illegal use of force.16 
These activities occur in a realm somewhere between war and 
peace, which is commonly referred to as the gray zone.17 
It is, perhaps, easier to define cyber–actions above gray zone 
activities that would amount to a use of force. American strategic 
thinking employs an effects test to measure cyberattacks in com-
parison to physical attacks.18 Koh explained that any cyber–
activities resulting in someone’s death would likely constitute a 
use of force.19 Koh listed factors to consider: “the context of the 
event, the actor perpetrating the action (recognizing challenging 
issues of attribution in cyberspace), the target and location, effects 
                                                                                                             
er  . . . Your legal concepts of property, expression, identify, movement, and 
context do not apply to us. They are all based on matter, and there is no matter 
here). 
 14 U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4. 
 15 U.N. Charter art. 51. 
 16 Koh Speech, supra note 9. compare id. with Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.) (Merits1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 191 
(June 27) (explaining, “it will be necessary to distinguish the most grave forms 
of the use of force (those constituting an armed attack) from other less grave 
forms”) and ¶ 249 (“[w]hile an armed attack would give rise to an entitlement to 
collective self-defense, a use of force of a lesser degree of gravity cannot  . . .  
produce any entitlement to take collective countermeasures involving the use of 
force”)). 
 17 Gary P. Corn, Cyber National Security: Navigating Gray Zone Challeng-
es In and Through Cyberspace, in COMPLEX BATTLESPACES: THE L. OF ARMED 
CONFLICT AND THE DYNAMICS OF MODERN WARFARE 345, 347 (Winston S. 
Williams & Christopher M. Ford eds., 2018). 
 18 Koh Speech, supra note 9 at 4. 
 19 Id. 
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and intent, among other possible issues.”20 Should a cyber opera-
tion trigger a nuclear plant meltdown, that would most likely 
amount to an illegal use of force against the United States; after all, 
the intent and target of the perpetrator could only be malicious. 
Overall, such an attack would be almost indistinguishable in effect 
from the Russians dropping a KAB–500S–E on that same reac-
tor.21 However, cyber operations in the gray zone are inherently 
insufficient in effects to qualify as an armed attack or a use of 
force. But these cyber–activities are still disruptive and unwelcome 
for victim states which demand legal responses and an effective 
means to deter, halt, or thwart such attacks. 
The gray zone creates a host of legal issues for the United 
States because the bulk of cyber operations pursued under the de-
fend forward strategy would most likely occur in the gray zone.22 
This means it will likely fall into one of the three tiers of the gray 
zone: espionage, a sovereignty violation, or a prohibited interven-
tion. Espionage, which includes cyber espionage, is not prohibited 
under international law, though it is certainly unwelcome.23 As the 
name would suggest, prohibited interventions are illegal under in-
ternational law and require coercion of one state against another.24 
They also enable the victim state to respond with countermeas-
ures.25 However, it is unclear whether a defend forward mission 
that violates another nation’s sovereignty in cyberspace also vio-
lates international law. 
                                                                                                             
 20 Id. 
 21 See KAB-500S / KAB-500S-E, MILITARY, https://www.globalsecurity
.org/military/world/russia/kab-500se.htm (A KAB-500S-E is the Russian equiv-
alent of a Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM)). 
 22 Robert Chesney, The Domestic Legal Framework for U.S. Military Cyber 
Operations, in NATIONAL SECURITY, TECHNOLOGY, AND LAW, HOOVER INST. 
(July 29, 2020), https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/7014455/Chesney-
Webreadypdf.pdf 
 23 Robert Chesney, The Pentagon’s General Counsel on the Law of Military 
Operations in Cyberspace, LAWFARE (March 9, 2020, 12:33 PM), https://www.
lawfareblog.com/pentagons-general-counsel-law-military-operations-
cyberspace. 
 24 Id. 
 25 See Mary Ellen O’Connell, Attribution and Other Conditions of Lawful 
Countermeasures to Cyber Misconduct, 10 NOTRE DAME J. OF INT’L & COMPAR. 
L. 1, 8 (2020). 
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Cyber Command successfully blocking Internet access to the 
Russian Internet Research Agency (IRA) in St. Petersburg in 2018 
is an excellent example of the dilemma defend forward faces.26 
The mission lasted for several days until American election results 
were certified.27 During the operation, Cyber Command contacted 
Russian operatives directly to make it clear the United States knew 
who they were.28 While this mission helped protect the integrity of 
American elections, no one has claimed that it amounted to a use 
of force. Still, as General Paul Nakasone, Commander of Cyber 
Command and Director of the National Security Agency, offered, 
disrupting the IRA in 2018 required “operating outside our bor-
ders, being outside our networks, to ensure that we understand 
what our adversaries are doing.”29 The DoD was operating in Rus-
sian cyberinfrastructure, or perhaps a third country’s cyber infra-
structure in order to target the IRA, depending on how the IRA had 
initially deployed its resources. This demonstrates the paradox in 
defending forward: because deterrence alone is ineffective, success 
demands taking action in foreign networks, often to protect the 
sovereignty of the United States. Does this mean the United States 
violated another nation’s sovereignty in order to defend its own? 
b. Sovereignty in Cyberspace 
Sovereignty is commonly considered the chief organizing prin-
ciple of nation–states that arose out of the Peace of Westphalia.30 
Historian F.H. Hinsley defined it as “the idea that there is a final 
                                                                                                             
 26 Ellen Nakashima, U.S. Cyber Command Operation Disrupted Internet 
Access of Russian Troll Factory on Day of 2018 Midterms, WASH. POST (Feb. 
27, 2019, 8:22 AM) https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security
/us-cyber-command-operation-disrupted-internet-access-of-russian-troll-factory-
on-day-of-2018-midterms/2019/02/26/1827fc9e-36d6-11e9-af5b-
b51b7ff322e9_story.html. The IRA is infamous as the troll factory that spread 
propaganda and misinformation in the 2016 election. Id. 
 27 Julian E. Barner, Cyber Command Operation Took Down Russian Troll 
Farm for Midterm Elections, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2019), https://www.nytimes
.com/2019/02/26/us/politics/us-cyber-command-russia.html. 
 28 See id. 
 29 An Interview with Paul M. Nakasone, JOINT FORCE Q. (2019), https
://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-92/jfq-92_4-9_Nakasone-
Interview.pdf. 
 30 See Derek Croxton, The Peace of Westphalia and the Origins of Sover-
eignty, 21 THE INT’L. HIST. REV. 569, 570 (1999). 
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and absolute political authority in the political community . . .  . . . 
and no final and absolute authority exists elsewhere.”31 In the tra-
ditional sense of nation–states this is a simple concept to grasp. 
When the Third Reich crossed the Polish border on September 1, 
1939, it had invaded the sovereignty of Poland because the Polish 
government was supposed to be the only government that exer-
cised control within its territories. The invasion was intended to 
coerce Warsaw into having no choice but to surrender. After the 
Second World War, the U.N. Charter reaffirmed the principle of 
sovereignty in Article 2(1) stating, “The Organization is based on 
the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.”32 
Sovereignty is both an internal and external concept. Internally, 
it refers to a state’s right to control those within the state and the 
activities that occur within its borders.33 This also includes a 
state’s ability to control individuals conducting cyber activities as 
well as its cyber infrastructure.34 Externally, sovereignty empow-
ers a state to conduct international relations; for example, declaring 
war or entering into a treaty.35 But in a world of interconnected 
cyberspace, where sending an email or doing a Google search of-
ten involves traveling through Internet service providers (ISP) and 
nodes across multiple countries, it is readily apparent that the oth-
erwise tidy geographical lines of sovereignty are muddled. 
This presents significant issues for DoD’s strategy of defend 
forward. As General Nakasone elucidated, defending forward de-
mands operating in foreign networks.36 However, customary inter-
national law has recognized that states are prohibited from inter-
vening in the internal or external sovereignty of another state.37 
                                                                                                             
 31 F.H. HINSLEY, SOVEREIGNTY 26 (2nd ed. 1966). 
 32 U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 1 (emphasis added). 
 33 Michael N. Schmitt, Grey Zones in the International Law of Cyberspace, 
42 YALE J. OF INT’L L. ONLINE 1, 4 (2018). 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id; Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.) (Merits), 1949 I.C.J. REP. 4, 43 (Apr. 9), 
(Judge Alvarez explained that sovereignty meant, “the whole body of rights and 
attributes which a state possesses in its territory, to the exclusion of all other 
states, and also in its relation with other states.”) 
 36 Nakasone, supra note 29. 
 37 See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. 
v. U.S.) (Merits), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 106, ¶ 202 (June 27) (holding that “[t]he prin-
ciple of non-intervention involves the right of every sovereign State to conduct 
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This protects states from intervention below what would otherwise 
qualify as a use of force.38 Indeed, the International Court of Jus-
tice has recognized non–intervention as “a corollary of the princi-
ple of the sovereign equality of States.”39 When the United States 
shut off the IRA’s Internet in 2018, it was operating in Russian 
cyberspace, and the mission had affected the ability of the Russian 
government to control the cyber activities within its territory.40 
Whether this mission violated international law is an open debate 
that revolves around two interpretations of the role of sovereignty 
in cyberwar and the gray zone. 
i. Sovereignty as a Rule 
Many states and legal experts view sovereignty as a rule within 
international law that may be violated through gray zone cyber 
operations.41 The Tallinn Manual 2.0 takes this approach when it 
stated, “[a] State must not conduct cyber operations that violate the 
sovereignty of another State.”42 That seems easy enough. Howev-
er, Michael Schmitt, who directed the Tallinn Manual compilation, 
acknowledged that state practice and opinio juris—a sense of legal 
obligation felt by a state—have not definitively coalesced around 
an understanding for sovereignty in the gray zone.43 In fact, some 
of the Tallinn Manual 2.0 experts proposed that sovereignty viola-
tions should be limited to cyber operations that cause physical 
                                                                                                             
its affairs without outside interference . . . the Court considers that it is part and 
parcel of customary international law.”). 
 38 Corn, supra note 17, at 410. 
 39 I.C.J., supra note 37 at ¶ 202. 
 40 After all, the Russians have passed a cyber sovereignty law and want to 
have a firewall like that of China. See Zak Doffman , Putin Now Has Russia’s 
Internet Kill Switch To Stop U.S. Cyberattacks, FORBES (Oct 28, 2019, 8:55 
PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/zakdoffman/2019/10/28/putin-now-has-
russias-internet-kill-switch-to-stop-us-cyberattacks/?sh=b24c6e031b2b. 
 41 Jack Kenny, France, Cyber Operations and Sovereignty: The ‘Purist’ 
Approach to Sovereignty and Contradictory State Practice, LAWFARE (March 
12, 2021, 8:01 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/france-cyber-operations-and-
sovereignty-purist-approach-sovereignty-and-contradictory-state-practice. 
 42 TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO 
CYBER OPERATIONS 17 (Michael N. Schmitt & Liis Vihul eds., 2017) [hereinaf-
ter TALLINN MANUAL 2.0]. 
 43 Schmitt, supra note 33, at 6. 
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damage.44 Ultimately, the majority of experts agree that cyber op-
erations that cause non–temporary loss of functionality violate 
sovereignty even when no physical damage occurs.45 Still, the ex-
perts could not agree on the precise threshold at which this occurs 
because of a lack of opinio juris from states. Additionally, the ex-
perts could not decide whether gray zone operations lacking physi-
cal effects or causing loss of functionality violated sovereignty, 
though they offered several possibilities.46 One of these, “ . . . 
causing a temporary, but significant, loss of functionality, as in the 
case of a major DDoS operation,”47 sounds awfully similar to 
Cyber Command disabling the IRA’s Internet for several days.48 
Importantly, the Tallinn Manual also concluded that a cyber opera-
tion which “usurps the inherently governmental functions of an-
other State” violates sovereignty.49 Unfortunately, the experts 
could not settle on a definition of inherently governmental func-
tions.50 
On its face, sovereignty, as a rule, is clear–cut. Brightline rules 
certainly make things simpler. Of the states offering opinions on 
this debate, most recognize sovereignty as a rule.51 Regrettably, 
this rule is not as easy to follow as it appears. While several states 
have offered a viewpoint, overall, very few states have answered 
                                                                                                             
 44 Id. 
 45 See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 42, at 20. 
 46 Id. at 21, (The possibilities included, “a cyber operation causing cyber 
infrastructure or programs to operate differently; altering or deleting data stored 
in cyber infrastructure without causing physical or functional consequences, as 
described above; emplacing malware into a system; installing backdoors; and 
causing a temporary, but significant, loss of functionality, as in the case of a 
major DDoS operation.”). 
 47 DDoS means Denial-of-service. Id. at 29. 
 48 See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 42, at 21. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. at 22. The experts agreed inherently governmental included “operation 
that interferes with data or services that are necessary for the exercise of inher-
ently governmental functions is prohibited as a violation of sovereignty,” which 
is rather circular in logic. Id. They offered potential examples, “changing or 
deleting data such that it interferes with the delivery of social services, the con-
duct of elections, the collection of taxes, the effective conduct of diplomacy, and 
the performance of key national defence activities.” Id. Still, the important point 
is they could ultimately not agree on what inherently governmental functions 
are. Id. 
 51 See infra text accompanying note 102. 
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this question.52 Oddly, the Tallinn experts proclaimed that sover-
eignty as a rule exists, but then explained that states must define 
what the rule means.53 For instance, the experts could not concur 
on the threshold for violating sovereignty via loss of functionality 
without physical damage.54 If such a threshold is indeterminate, it 
would be hard to describe sovereignty as a rule. Rather, a principle 
would seem more accurate. Ultimately, state practice and opinio 
juris will crystalize into international law.55 But, at the moment, 
the experts are putting the cart before the horse. The Tallinn Man-
ual is a useful jumping–off point for states hoping to answer this 
question, but it is not law. This is not to say that the Tallinn experts 
are wrong. They may be right, but their determinations read more 
as lex feranda, as opposed to lex lata.56 
ii. Sovereignty as a Principle 
On the other hand, several scholars view sovereignty as a 
“baseline principle undergirding specific primary norms,” such as 
the prohibition on the use of force.57 They argue state practice and 
opinio juris have not crystallized into a common understanding 
that sovereignty is an independent rule of customary international 
law that gray zone operations violate.58 Without a clear prohibi-
tion, it is ultimately up to states to decide for themselves whether 
sovereignty is a rule or principle through practice, treaties, or dec-
larations.59 Currently, the inherent tension between internal and 
external sovereignty—the right to control cyber activities within a 
state’s territory and the concurrent right of states to execute cyber 
operations as a form of international affairs—has produced a prin-
ciple. Under this thinking, the principle of sovereignty should be 
                                                                                                             
 52 Harriet Moynihan, The Application of International Law to State 
Cyberattacks: Sovereignty and Non-Intervention, CHATHAM HOUSE (Dec. 2, 
2019), https://www.chathamhouse.org/2019/12/application-international-law-
state-cyberattacks/2-application-sovereignty-cyberspace. 
 53 See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 42, at 17-27. 
 54 Id. at 20-21. 
 55 Moynihan, supra note 52, at 2 
 56 Corn, supra note 17, at 419. 
 57 Id. at 414-15. 
 58 Id. at 416-7. 
 59 Id. at 421. 
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considered before any military operations, but it is not determina-
tive.60 
Ret. Colonel Gary Corn offers compelling reasons for why 
sovereignty as a rule is erroneous and why a principle is more ac-
curate. In addition to states not having a consistent practice or stat-
ed opinion, experts themselves cannot agree.61 Corn points to de-
bates among the International Group of Experts who authored the 
Tallin Manuals on what type of cyber operation would violate sov-
ereignty.62 Corn is also critical of the Tallinn experts for only con-
sidering territorial sovereignty and confusing internal sovereignty 
with the inviolability of borders under both Article 2(4) and nonin-
tervention.63 These, Corn contends, demand a higher threshold 
before violation than cyber operations affecting information and 
technology infrastructure inside another state’s borders.64 Apply-
ing this thinking, Cyber Command shutting the IRA’s internet off 
in 2018 would not rise to the level of prohibited intervention, let 
alone a use of force. Additionally, Corn points out that espionage, 
despite violating domestic laws in victims states, does not violate 
international law.65 This lends credence to the acceptability of tak-
ing actions internally in the territory of a foreign state. Lastly, alt-
hough sovereignty itself is universal as a principle, its application 
is unique across different domains. Corn and Robert Taylor, for-
mer Principal Deputy General Counsel of the Department of De-
fense, note the “different regimes to govern the air, space, and mar-
itime domains underscores the fallacy of a universal rule of sover-
eignty with a clear application to the domain of cyberspace.”66 
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This statement reinforces how state practice will determine the 
application of sovereignty more than anything else. 
Schmitt rebuts Corn’s thinking and points out that throughout 
the seven years of deliberations among Tallinn Manual experts, not 
once did the sovereignty as a principle idea surface.67 This is a 
weak argument. The fact that an idea is new or novel does not in-
herently disqualify it and the academic and global situation has 
changed greatly since Tallinn 2.0. To start, a growing consensus of 
experts agree that traditional deterrence is a fool’s errand in the 
gray zone, and the DoD promulgated defend forward a year after 
Tallinn 2.0. Significantly, the United States, the world’s most 
powerful cyber power, and its greatest target, has not adopted the 
“sovereignty as a rule approach.” Therefore, an examination of 
state practice and opinio juris of the United States will assist in 
understanding how the United States is reconciling defend forward 
and the issue of sovereignty. 
III. HOW AMERICAN AND FOREIGN STATE PRACTICE AND 
OPINIO JURIS ON SOVEREIGNTY IN CYBERSPACE DEMONSTRATE 
THAT SOVEREIGNTY IS A PRINCIPLE, NOT A RULE 
This section begins with a discussion of how the United States’ 
position on sovereignty in cyberspace has been articulated with 
greater clarity since 2012 when Koh first vaguely established the 
American position that sovereignty is a principle. This includes an 
analysis of Koh’s position as well as that of the subsequent State 
Department Legal Advisor, Brian Egan, and also of the DoD’s 
General Counsel, Paul C. Ney Jr. Next, the section considers the 
practice of American allies: France and the United Kingdom. 
France has taken the view that sovereignty is a rule, whereas Brit-
ain is even clearer than the United States that sovereignty is a prin-
ciple. The section concludes by examining the hypocrisy of Amer-
ican adversaries, Russia and China, in their views on cyberspace. 
Both nations want to have their cake and eat it too. 
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a. American State Practice and Opinio Juris on Sovereignty 
in Cyberspace 
Although not explicit, American state practice and opinio juris 
have adopted sovereignty as a principle. In the same 2012 speech 
in which he declared that international law applied in cyberspace, 
Harold Koh declared that before conducting cyber operations, in-
cluding in armed conflict, the “sovereignty of other states needs to 
be considered.”68 This is because the physical infrastructure of the 
Internet is located across multiple countries and jurisdictions and 
because the effects of a single operation in one nation may be felt 
in many others.69 Though he did not say so explicitly, it appears 
Koh did not endorse the sovereignty as a rule approach. After all, a 
rule is not something to simply be considered, but instead fol-
lowed. However, Koh’s thoughts on sovereignty in cyberspace 
were a brief paragraph in a lengthy speech. 
Four years later, the next State Department Legal Advisor, Bri-
an Egan, built on Koh’s initial assertion. Egan clarified that the 
United States respects the sovereignty of all states to pass laws that 
govern their territories and operations which violate those laws 
could be prosecuted in the victim state or have foreign policy con-
sequences.70 Whether such an operation violated international law 
was a separate question.71 Egan acknowledged a cyber operation in 
another state’s territory could violate international law, despite not 
amounting to a use of force, and that because of the physical de-
sign of the Internet this could encroach on another state’s sover-
eignty.72 Nevertheless, Egan opined, “Precisely when a non–
consensual cyber operation violates the sovereignty of another 
State is a question lawyers within the U.S. government continue to 
study carefully, and it is one that ultimately will be resolved 
through the practice and opinio juris of States.”73 Egan’s statement 
demonstrates that as of 2016, the United States had not adopted 
sovereignty as a rule approach. If a rule already existed, it would 
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not require additional state practice or opinio juris, it would simply 
exist. Egan would have been able to assert its existence. 
Egan next considered nonintervention, the corollary of sover-
eignty, and coercion intended to affect the victim state’s ability to 
affect an issue it should have exclusive control over because of its 
sovereign rights.74 Egan called this a “relatively narrow rule of 
customary international law.”75 He then cited cyber operations that 
interfered in a victim state’s ability to hold a free election or if 
those operations actually manipulated the results of that election as 
an example of a prohibited intervention.76 So, although Egan did 
not call sovereignty a rule, nonintervention, a derivative of sover-
eignty, is a rule. This reinforces the line of thinking that sovereign-
ty is a principle from which other primary rules emanate.77 
Still, the answer is perhaps more nuanced. Importantly, Egan’s 
speech was made on November 10, 2016, two days after the Presi-
dential election, and long after the upper echelons of the U.S. gov-
ernment knew of Russian interference in the election.78 In fact, 
President Obama had already issued a warning to President Putin 
on October 31, 2016, that “[i]nternational law, including the law 
for armed conflict, applies to actions in cyberspace.”79 Obama 
could have told Putin that Russia’s actions amounted to an act of 
war; in fact, at least one senior advisor recommended he assert that 
interfering in our election was an act of war.80 Instead, Obama 
chose a vague warning. 
This begs the question of what the Democratic National Com-
mittee (DNC) hack was under international law. To start, no one is 
arguing it amounted to an illegal use of force.81 Professor William 
Banks believes it was not even a prohibited intervention or interna-
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tionally wrongful act.82 Certainly, the Russians stole and published 
private information, but that was espionage, which is not prohibit-
ed under international law. Had the Russians actually used cyber 
weapons to “tamper with voting machines or change votes” that 
would be coercion, as it would have limited American ability to 
have a free and fair election.83 Nonetheless, few would argue the 
Russians did not “change votes” through their propaganda and dis-
semination of fake news – different than the private, but true, 
emails of Hillary Clinton, John Podesta, and others. In fact, former 
CIA Director, General Michael Hayden, said Russia had gone fur-
ther than “honorable state espionage” when it “weaponized” the 
data it stole.84 In this sense, the Russian hack was coercive, and 
that seems to be what Egan was implying in his speech. 
Obama’s statement to Putin and Egan’s speech, made only 
weeks apart, demonstrate the United States grasping for the correct 
terminology to describe the Russian election hack while simulta-
neously providing American forces enough latitude to conduct fu-
ture cyber operations. Egan made clear that cyber operations on 
devices in foreign jurisdictions are not a “per se violation of inter-
national law. In other words, there is no absolute prohibition on 
such operations as a matter of international law. This is perhaps 
most clear where such activities in another State’s territory have no 
effects or de minimis effects.”85 This could mean two things: that 
cyber operations in foreign states do not violate sovereignty, or 
that sovereignty violations do not automatically produce interna-
tional law violations. Either way, sovereignty is not a rule. There-
fore, it must be a principle. Moreover, by stating that operations 
lacking in effects or those with de minimis effects do not inherently 
violate sovereignty, Egan is attempting to resolve what happens if 
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Cyber Command must operate in third party or neutral nation net-
works to thwart its adversaries. 
Interestingly, Professor Banks notes that under the sovereignty 
as a rule and the Tallinn 2.0 approach, the Russian election hack 
would have violated sovereignty. Still, when it came to American 
state practice, the American response of “relatively nonthreatening 
self–help retorsion” demonstrated the United States viewed the 
hack not as “internationally wrongful acts, but instead as a species 
of espionage that is generally unregulated by international law.”86 
This makes sense, though it neglects the possibility that the United 
States, for strategic and or political reasons, decided against a 
greater response despite a violation of international law. Regard-
less, this is incredibly frustrating as it seemingly lets Russia off the 
hook. But the United States may have responded in kind with pro-
portionate, covert actions within the gray zone. Since Egan’s 
speech, the State Department has not officially weighed in on the 
subject. 
The most recent American pronouncements on sovereignty in 
cyberspace came from DoD’s General Counsel, Paul C. Ney Jr., on 
March 2, 2020. In his speech, Ney asserted the Pentagon’s attor-
neys take the “principle of sovereignty” into account.87 Ney clari-
fied that states certainly retain sovereignty over the physical infra-
structure in their territories that creates cyberspace, but he 
acknowledged that “implications of sovereignty for cyberspace are 
complex.”88 Reading between the lines, this implies that if sover-
eignty was a binding rule, it would likely bind Cyber Command 
and prevent a defend forward strategy. And then, in a step Koh and 
Egan never took, Ney said, “we continue to study this issue and 
how State practice evolves in this area, even if it does not appear 
that there exists a rule that all infringements on sovereignty in cy-
berspace necessarily involve violations of international law.”89 To 
date, Ney is the highest level American official to explicitly argue 
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that sovereignty is not a rule. Although Ney said attorneys would 
continue to study the issue,90 it appears the DoD has determined or 
is leaning strongly in the direction that sovereignty is a principle 
and not a rule as applied to cyberspace. 
While Ney’s speech is useful, it is not as determinative as Koh 
or Egan’s speeches. The State Department speeches occurred only 
after interagency review with the goal of producing a “whole–of––
government position.”91 Ney’s speech is a manifestation of only 
the Pentagon’s position.92 Nevertheless, Ney indicates that the 
DoD’s attorneys vet proposed cyber operations through an espio-
nage lens.93 Michael Schmitt explains that in this assessment, if a 
cyber operation resembles intelligence or counterintelligence activ-
ities it does not violate sovereignty.94 However, if the DoD attor-
neys do not see a congruency then it could violate sovereignty.95 
Schmitt questions why the Pentagon would bother with such an 
assessment if sovereignty could not be violated.96 As to Ney’s 
statement on sovereignty itself, Schmitt interprets that some cyber 
operations in the gray zone could violate international law.97 The 
trouble is identifying which ones do and which ones do not. No 
matter, Schmitt’s argument ignores that the State Department and 
the DoD believe that although sovereignty can be violated, this 
does not mean international law is automatically violated.98 
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b. American Allies – France and the United Kingdom Weigh in on 
Sovereignty 
i. France – A Contradiction in Opinio Juris and State Practice 
At first glance, France has taken the position that sovereignty is 
a rule under international law that may be violated.99 In 2019, 
France’s Ministry of Armed Forces proclaimed, “any cyberattack 
against French digital systems or any effects produced on French 
territory by digital means by a State organ  . . .  constitutes a breach 
of sovereignty.”100 However, although many commentators con-
cluded that France was articulating that sovereignty is a rule of 
international law, this was not as clearly articulated as nations, 
such as Finland.101 Indeed, Finland recently states “Finland sees 
sovereignty as a primary norm of public international law, a breach 
of which amounts to an internationally wrongful act and triggers 
State responsibility. This norm is fully applicable in cyberspace, 
too.”102 Many other states, such as Austria, Czech Republic, Ger-
many, the Netherlands and others have taken a similar approach.103 
Furthermore, France’s own actions add complexity to its official 
pronunciation. For example, France recently participated in Opera-
tion Ladybird, a global operation to disrupt the Emotet botnets, 
which have proven to be one of the past decade’s greatest cyber 
threats.104 The operation occurred in conjunction with the United 
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States, United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Germany, Canada, and 
Lithuania.105 To disrupt the Emotet botnets, France and others took 
control of three of Emotet’s command and control servers, updated 
its code, and assumed control of an additional 700 command and 
control servers located across 90 states around the globe.106 Au-
thorities then disabled and quarantined the Emotet in infected 
computers.107 Operation Ladybird also installed a “time–bomb–
like code” that will uninstall Emotet from all infected computers 
on April 25, 2021.108 
However, France and the other states involved did not request 
or receive permission from the 90 states whose cyberspace they 
operated in.109 Under France’s definition of sovereignty, France 
likely violated the sovereignty of those nations through Operation 
Ladybird because it operated in third party nations’ cyberspace. 
Some of the other states involved, like Germany and the Nether-
lands, more affirmatively view sovereignty as a rule. Germany’s 
approach is, “Germany agrees with the view that cyber operations 
attributable to States which violate the sovereignty of another State 
are contrary to international law. In this regard, State sovereignty 
constitutes a legal norm in its own right . . . “110 Overall, even 
among the states who profess that sovereignty is a rule under inter-
national law, those states lack a coherent understanding of what 
operations actually violate sovereignty. The Netherlands, Germany 
and others claim an all or nothing approach, though their actions 
can contradict their words. The lack of agreement demonstrates 
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that even if sovereignty is a rule, there is no agreement on what the 
rule is. This discord renders sovereignty a principle in effect. 
ii. United Kingdom – Definitively Opposed to Sovereignty as 
a Rule 
The United Kingdom has taken an approach similar to the 
United States, except it has been more vocal. On May 23, 2018, 
UK Attorney General, Jeremy Wright, announced, “I am not per-
suaded that we can currently extrapolate from that general princi-
ple a specific rule or additional prohibition for cyber activity be-
yond that of a prohibited intervention.”111 And then, in bold firm-
ness declared, “The UK Government’s position is therefore that 
there is no such rule as a matter of current international law.”112 
This is an unequivocal rejection of the Tallinn Manual 2.0’s ap-
proach to sovereignty. However, it is worth noting that Wright 
used the word “currently” in his speech. This leaves open the pos-
sibility that with future state practice this could evolve. 
The United Kingdom’s approach is a double–edged sword. On 
the one hand, it provides British policymakers complete operation-
al flexibility in the gray zone. On the other hand, the United King-
dom has a limited vocabulary from which to condemn unfriendly 
cyberactions directed. This presents a dilemma for a nation on the 
receiving end of roughly ten cyber–attacks each week.113 Instead, 
the only principle the United Kingdom may still point to in the 
gray zone is non–intervention. The difference, of course, between 
violating sovereignty and engaging in a prohibited intervention is 
that prohibited intervention demands coercion. Should Russia, 
China, or another unfriendly actor commit the equivalent of the 
DNC election hack during a United Kingdom election or spread 
fake–news and misinformation, that would likely not count as co-
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ercion. If such acts are prohibited under international law as sover-
eignty violations, then the United Kingdom could respond in kind 
with countermeasures. But if they are not prohibited, then the 
United Kingdom cannot declare the perpetrators have violated in-
ternational law. Notwithstanding, it may respond in kind because 
those actions still would not violate international law. Ultimately, 
this approach enables the United Kingdom to engage in gray zone 
activities beneath prohibited interventions without waiting for an 
illegal intervention as license. In short, the United Kingdom’s Na-
tional Cyber Force may go on the offensive and hunt cyber foes 
before they launch their attacks. By definitively answering the 
question of sovereignty, the United Kingdom may defend forward 
in cyberspace. 
c. American Adversaries – China and Russia – Charlatans of 
Sovereignty 
On sovereignty, China and Russia want to have it both ways. 
They demand that other states limit their external sovereignty, but 
they are quick to complain that other states have violated Russian 
or Chinese sovereignty through cyber operations. Hypocritically, 
both demonstrate a clear disregard for the sovereignty of other 
states. 
In 2019, Vladimir Putin signed a law to create Russia’s “Sov-
ereign Internet,” an internal Russian Internet.114 This law provided 
Putin a “kill switch” to the world wide web in the event Russia 
deemed it necessary to operate an intranet. Moscow justified the 
law citing national security threats and fear of cyber–attacks 
against Russia.115 While the real impetus behind this law was in-
creasing centralized control and the ability to repress dissent, this 
law also reveals Russia’s belief that the Russian state should retain 
complete control over its cyber space and that any unauthorized 
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intrusions would violate Russia’s sovereignty. China has also 
passed cyber sovereignty legislation to control the flow of infor-
mation in and out of China.116 It begins by setting forth its goals 
and aims. Article 1 of the 2016 Cybersecurity Law proclaims, 
“This Law is formulated in order to: ensure cybersecurity; safe-
guard cyberspace sovereignty and national security . . .  and pro-
mote the healthy development of the informatization of the econ-
omy and society.”117 Overall, the law reinforces what China calls 
its “Golden Shield” and what the West refers to as the “Great 
Firewall.”118 
In June 2017, the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) 
failed in its mandate to develop a “common understanding” of the 
proper behavior for states in cyberspace because Russia and China, 
among others, objected to the final draft.119 The proposal made 
clear that use of force and international humanitarian law applied 
in cyberspace.120 Subsequently, Russia and China proposed an 
Open–Ended Working Group (OEWG) to continue where the GGE 
failed to achieve consensus.121 In their 2019 opening statement 
before the OEWG, China proclaimed, “It is widely endorsed by the 
international community that the principle of sovereignty applies in 
cyberspace.”122 This statement sounds like an endorsement of sov-
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ereignty as a principle instead of a rule. However, such an interpre-
tation would misunderstand Chinese, and for that matter, Russian 
interpretations of sovereignty. 
China and Russia have strongly promoted the idea of cyber 
sovereignty as a means of absolute control over their internal cy-
berspaces. They intend and claim the right to balkanize the Internet 
through the right of sovereignty.123 Thus, any action that inhibited 
their ability to be the sole power that could, for example, turn the 
Internet on or off, slow it down, or manipulate data—all within 
their territorial cyberspace (for lack of a better word)—would vio-
late state sovereignty. The Deputy Director of the People’s Libera-
tion Army (PLA) National Defense University, Colonel Li Ming-
hai, equates controlling cyberspace in the 21st century with control-
ling the seas and air in prior centuries.124 It is a domain that, for 
national security purposes, must be controlled or China will once 
again face Western colonial dominance .125 Russia sees cyberspace 
similarly.126 Threats to sovereignty—to Russia and China—are a 
matter of national security. It is not just a rule, it is the goal. Any 
actions that reduce state control hinder and violate sovereignty.127 
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Russia and China view defending forward, which entails operating 
in foreign cyberspace, as a violation of their sovereignty. Of 
course, the great irony is that both Russia and China are notorious 
for their cyber–attacks against the United States.128 But if the Unit-
ed States dared to reciprocate those attacks, both Russia and China 
would claim the United States had violated their inherent right to 
cyber sovereignty. This demonstrates the potential for weaponizing 
sovereignty to prevent nations that value international law from 
engaging in strategies like defend forward. As Koh put it in his 
2012 speech, “If we succeed in promoting a culture of compliance, 
we will reap the benefits. And if we earn a reputation for compli-
ance, the actions we do take will earn enhanced legitimacy world-
wide for their adherence to the rule of law.” Koh is right, the Unit-
ed States should always set the right example, and reputation mat-
ters. Balancing this admirable goal without being caught flat–
footed, however, will never be easy. 
IV. RECONCILING DEFEND FORWARD AND SOVEREIGNTY 
If deterrence was working in cyberspace, then defend forward 
would not be necessary. Unfortunately, deterrence has not proven 
effective in making American adversaries recalculate their cyberat-
tacks against the United States in the gray zone. These adversaries 
have no qualms about wielding international law as a shield to pro-
tect their so–called cyber sovereignty while simultaneously slash-
ing through another nation’s sovereignty with the sword of offen-
sive cyber operations. The United States, however, is better than 
that. International law is the touchstone of international affairs. 
Therefore, defend forward should fit within the legal structures in 
place. 
Defend forward originated because the United States recog-
nized that a stationary defense was impractical. No matter the qual-
ity of American defenses, an adversary would find a way through. 
                                                                                                             
matic escalation that could culminate in war—all because neither side properly 
understood the other. Id. 
 128 See, e.g., Scott Neuman, Intelligence Chiefs Say China, Russia Are Big-
gest Threats To U.S., NPR (April 14, 2021, 2:50 PM), https://www.npr.org/
2021/04/14/987132385/intelligence-chiefs-say-china-russia-are-biggest-threats-
to-u-s. 
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The strategy of defend forward rests on the assumption that Amer-
ican adversaries are determined to infiltrate American cyber net-
works. No one would dispute this assumption, and there is no rea-
son to think this is about to change. But understanding that defend 
forward is anticipating hostile attacks is helpful because it places 
the strategy on firmer legal footing. Disabling the IRA’s Internet 
for several days should be seen as an in–kind response in anticipa-
tion of the IRA intending to violate American sovereignty or 
committing a prohibited intervention. Further, Cyber Command is 
not launching cyber operations at random. The Intelligence Com-
munity assists in developing the targets for its missions. 
Congress has also legalized defend forward. Against our chief 
adversaries, Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran, the 2019 NDAA 
authorized what Robert Chesney described as a mini–AUMF for 
cyber operations.129 The NDAA authorized cyber operations in the 
event DoD determined these foes are “conducting an active, sys-
tematic, and ongoing campaign of attacks against the Government 
or people of the United States in cyberspace . . . “130 Note the word 
ongoing. Congress likely inserted this language recognizing that 
these four adversaries would continue the perpetual cyber–attacks 
against the United States. Next, Cyber Command may “take ap-
propriate and proportional action in foreign cyberspace to disrupt, 
defeat, and deter such attacks.”131 The NDAA broadly spoke of 
foreign cyberspace, not Russian, Chinese, North Korean, or Irani-
an.132 This appears to permit operations in the cyberspace of third–
party nations that are not the ultimate target. Had Congress wanted 
to limit operations in those four countries, it could have specified 
such. Instead, it recognized that cyberwar has no fixed sovereignty 
when it comes to the battlefield. Overall, the NDAA legalizes per-
sistent engagement and defend forward. 
However, the 2019 NDAA only authorized cyber operations 
against four adversaries and did not explicitly authorize operations 
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in the cyber space of other threats or third–party nations.133 And 
foreign cyberspace could be interpreted as only that of Russia, 
China, North Korea, or Iran. The 2020 NDAA went a step further 
and authorized military operations “short of hostilities and in areas 
outside of areas of active hostilities for the purpose of preparation 
of the environment, influence, force protection, and deterrence of 
hostilities.”134 Short of hostilities is more certainly a license for 
gray zone operations. Additionally, the 2020 NDAA granted the 
Secretary of Defense authority to conduct cyber operations against 
a “foreign power.”135 Areas outside of areas of active hostilities 
removed any existing ambiguity about whether Cyber Command 
could launch missions in a neutral nation’s cyberspace. Foreign 
power is more than just Russia, China, North Korea, or Iran. The 
language is broad and allows actions against non–state actors. But 
domestic authorization does not guarantee that Cyber Command’s 
actions are legal under international law, particularly if these ac-
tions violate another nation’s sovereignty. 
When Cyber Command executed defend forward under the 
2019 and 2020 NDAAs, it did not violate international law regard-
less of whether they violated another nation’s sovereignty. To start, 
the 2019 NDAA limited cyber operations to proportional actions. 
This means any action Cyber Command takes is necessarily in re-
sponse to either a prior attack or a perceived threat. Russia hacked 
the 2016 election, and American intelligence likely determined that 
Russia intended to do the same in 2018. Hence, Cyber Command 
was acting on the belief of an imminent attack when it shut off the 
IRA’s Internet just before the 2018 elections. 
Because the 2019 NDAA required proportional responses, 
Cyber Command will not be able to violate sovereignty under do-
mestic law, even if sovereignty was an international rule of law 
that could be violated. For instance, if Russia’s SolarWinds attack 
violated American sovereignty and an international rule of law, 
then the United States could legally resort to countermeasures and 
respond in–kind through proportionate means—cyber or not. If 
SolarWinds violated sovereignty, but did not violate international 
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law, then a proportionate American response would be unlikely to 
violate international law, even if it violated Russian sovereignty.136 
In the latter example, the American response would be classified as 
a retorsion.137 
Michael Schmitt refers to this as “in–kind” responses.138 
Schmitt elaborates that those in–kind responses may not be puni-
tive, but may only be intended to stop the hostile actor or to secure 
reparations.139 Schmitt lists proportionality as a requirement for 
in–kind responses, though this seems a bit redundant. For Schmitt, 
the key is intent. He explains, “[an]in–kind response that itself 
would otherwise be unlawful is only justified if its primary purpose 
is permissible.”140 Even so, discerning intent is arduous without a 
long history of state practice and because of this there are signifi-
cant issues of attribution. Calculating a proportional response and, 
perhaps most importantly, foreseeing how an adversary will classi-
fy that response are equally challenging. A miscalculated response, 
even if the actor sincerely believes and intends the response to be 
proportional or in–kind, could be received as an escalation. 
As state practice and opinio juris around gray zone cyber activ-
ities and sovereignty continue to evolve, nation states will likely 
engage in tacit bargaining to create these norms.141 Explicit bar-
gaining is actual negotiation between states to achieve an under-
standing. Tacit bargaining involves actions, statements, and decla-
rations that form a recognizable pattern defining limits, restraints, 
and predictable responses.142 Overtime, each side comes to recog-
nize what is acceptable and unacceptable behavior, which increas-
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es stability. Michael Fischerkeller and Richard Harknett argue that 
defending forward and persistent engagement align with tacit bar-
gaining, but stress it is critical for each side to clearly communicate 
what they are doing.143 
This still does not answer the question of third–party or neutral 
nation sovereignty under international law. Fortunately, from the 
limited amount of non–classified information available, it seems 
Cyber Command has limited its operations in third–party nations’ 
networks to those that create only a de minimis effect. This avoids 
the sovereignty issue entirely. For example, to take ISIS offline in 
Operation Glowing Symphony, Cyber Command had to access 
data on nodes around the world, not just in Syria and Iraq.144 
ISIS’s data was often stored on the same server as civilian data.145 
Before launching an attack in these foreign nodes, Joint Task Force 
ARES had to prove to DoD officials and Members of Congress 
that the operation would only affect ISIS’s data.146 Although Cyber 
Command would be operating in a third–party nation’s network, 
essentially trespassing on its network, the effects would be mini-
mal. Without naming it, Cyber Command employed a de minimis 
effects standard when carrying out Operation Glowing Symphony. 
Of course, questions will remain should Cyber Command not 
be able to leave civilian data untouched or if the effects on a third–
party nation would be greater than de minimis. Over time, as more 
operations like Glowing Symphony are conducted, the American 
confidence will grow both in how precise Cyber Command’s 
strikes can be and what constitutes acceptable practice. Operation 
Glowing Symphony is an important and early example of state 
                                                                                                             
 143 See id. 
 144 See Elena Chachko & Ashley Deeks, Which States Support the ‘Unwill-
ing and Unable’ Test?, LAWFARE (Oct. 10, 2016, 1:55 PM), https://www.law
fareblog.com/which-states-support-unwilling-and-unable-test (explaining that 
the AUMF did not authorize cyber operations against either Iraq or Syria, this 
would not present a problem under international law because both states had 
failed to contain and control an international terrorist group. The United States 
had the ability under international law to defend itself because the governments 
or Syria and Iraq had both failed to contain and control ISIS and, because of 
state sovereignty, were responsible for all internal actions within their borders). 
 145 Dina Temple-Raston, How The U.S. Hacked ISIS, NPR (Sept. 26, 2019, 
5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/09/26/763545811/how-the-u-s-hacked-isis. 
 146 Id. 
2021] UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW 83 
 
practice defining the strategy of defend forward. Additionally, 
America’s position that sovereignty is a principle will inform fu-
ture state practice in future missions. Cyber Command will careful-
ly consider the consequences of its actions vis–à–vis sovereignty, 
but not necessarily stop because of it. 
Ultimately, it seems that in practice the effect of sovereignty as 
a rule and sovereignty as a principle will be nearly identical. As 
Schmitt points out, even if sovereignty is a rule, actions and re-
sponses are not limited so long as the intent of defending forward 
is to stop adversaries from attacking the United States instead of 
being punitive.147 Since the 2019 AUMF authorized Cyber Com-
mand to engage in proportional cyber operations, those operations 
must always be in response to prior acts or anticipated acts. And 
because sovereignty is a principle that should be considered, but is 
not determinative in cyberspace, defend forward operations that 
violate sovereignty are not inherently internationally wrongful 
acts—they are legal retorsions against enemies. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This paper has focused on the question of whether defend for-
ward operations that violate other nations’ sovereignty also violate 
international law. Because sovereignty in cyberspace is a principle 
and not a rule, and because American domestic law authorizes de-
fend forward as a response to ongoing attacks against the United 
States, defend forward does not violate international law. Howev-
er, this does not answer the question of whether defend forward 
will work. Defend forward is worth trying because deterrence has 
not been working.148 In that same vein, asking whether defend 
forward will work while maintaining the goal posts of deterrence 
sets defend forward up for failure. The goal is not deterrence so 
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much as it is disruption. In the long run, perhaps, defend forward 
may deter adversaries if the costs of attacking the United States 
become too high. In the meantime, defend forward will likely work 
because it provides the United States the operational flexibility 
necessary to confront its foes who have remained defiant without 
waiting for them to attack. The United States can engage on its 
own terms and bring the fight to the enemy. 
Defend forward is not without risk. Many critics fear trading 
cyber responses will quickly and unpredictably escalate out of the 
gray zone and into use of force and armed attacks, whether cyber 
or not.149 This means Cyber Command must carefully consider 
how China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and others will perceive its 
missions. Crucially, despite defend forward being inherently re-
sponsive under American law, adversaries will likely never view 
American actions as responsive. They will label the United States 
as the perpetrator and aggressor. Understanding “the realities of the 
mentalities or the localities” is paramount for conducting shrewd 
and successful international affairs.150 
General Nakasone and others must therefore take gradual and 
calculated actions while defending forward. Missions should slow-
ly and barely escalate, if at all, while also leaving a calling card 
demonstrating America’s resolve, capabilities, and the rule going 
forward. Over time, tacit bargaining will crystalize norms that pro-
vide nations with firmer footing of what is acceptable and unac-
ceptable behavior in the gray zone. Without defend forward, this 
would not be possible, or at least not as effective, as the United 
States would be at the mercy of its enemies as they set the norms. 
Time will tell whether defend forward works. The thwarting of the 
IRA ahead of the 2018 elections and Operation Glowing Sympho-
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ny are reasons for optimism. Of course, anything can happen—
even a Pearl Harbor level cyber event—despite Cyber Command’s 
best efforts. But this will not be because Cyber Command was sit-
ting behind a computer idly waiting for an attack to come. The war 
is already here. Defend forward recognizes this new reality and 
brings the war to the enemy’s doorstep. 
 
